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1.1  Introduction 
Conceptually, the appropriate decision as to assignment of ownership 
rights is that arrangement that minimizes transactions costs between the 
firm and its various contractors. For various reasons, including asymmet- 
ric information between buyers (patients) and sellers (hospitals and oth- 
ers), the dominance of third-party payment, and consumption externali- 
ties, it is widely believed among experts in the health field and many in the 
public that the for-profit organizational form does not minimize transac- 
tions cost in the hospital sector (e.g., Relman 1980; Gray 1991). 
The for-profit (FP) hospital is in the minority numerically in all indus- 
trialized countries. In the United States presently, only 10 percent of hospi- 
tal beds are in FP hospitals, with 70 percent being in private not-for-profit 
(NFP) and 20 percent  in  public institutions  (Claxton et al.  1997). For- 
profit hospitals fall into two groups-small,  independent, privately held 
hospitals, often physician owned, and hospitals that are part of publicly 
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owned corporations. Although the for-profit share has been quite stable 
historically, for-profit chain hospitals have grown both numerically and in 
influence in many communities since they first appeared in the late 1960s. 
The growth of  these hospital companies has not been steady, but rather 
has been characterized by  cycles of growth (Gray and Schlesinger 1997). 
Most of the 1990s have been a growth period for the hospital companies, 
with many NFP and government hospitals being acquired by  these firms 
(Kuttner 1996a, 1996b; Needleman, Chollet, and Lamphere 1997). The re- 
maining for-profit hospitals that are independent free-standing organiza- 
tions command much less interest because they are small in terms of bed 
capacity and are a vanishing breed. 
The growth of for-profit chains in particular has elicited substantial con- 
cern, especially among some health care leaders. They have argued that 
consolidation of hospitals under the aegis of publicly owned corporations 
will mean higher priced and lower quality care, lower rates of production 
of outputs that-although  unprofitable to hospitals-have  high marginal 
social benefit, and less accessible care to those with low ability to pay (see, 
e.g., Relman 1980). As Gray and Schlesinger explained, the reasons for es- 
chewing the for-profit ownership form for hospitals comes down to two is- 
sues: trust and community benefits. Others see much potential for market- 
driven  health  care  to deliver  personal  health  care  services efficiently 
(Herzlinger 1997). 
Conversions from public to NFP hospital status are also manifestations 
of a trend of assigning the responsibility of public goals to private organi- 
zations. A similar trend is occurring in primary and secondary education 
and to a lesser extent in corrections and in certain municipal services (Kutt- 
ner 1997, 356-61). 
A  related  development is  the  increased commercialization of  some 
large public hospital systems, perhaps reflecting reduced public subsidies. 
As large public hospital  systems seek to improve their competitiveness 
through acquisition of smaller public, quasi-public, or even NFP facilities, 
local communities are faced with reduced control and potential loss of a 
public asset and/or the benefit flows from this asset (Bell et al. 1997; Gray 
1997). 
Buying and selling of hospitals is receiving a considerable amount of 
public interest and scrutiny, both in the media and by  public regulatory 
agencies (Horwitz 1998). Aside from antitrust scrutiny to gauge the effect 
on competition,  the vast majority  of mergers and acquisitions are not 
subject to public scrutiny because both buyer and seller are believed to 
be reasonably empowered to conduct the transaction  in their own  self- 
interests. 
In this context, however, sellers-the  communities in the case of public 
and NFP hospitals-may  not be sufficiently empowered or knowledgeable 
to act in their own  self-interests. One reason is that the sellers may  not Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  15 
have the requisite expertise. Such transactions occur very infrequently. The 
process of determining fair value is made difficult because of the multidi- 
mensional attributes of  the transactions and the heterogeneous prefer- 
ences of various stakeholders in the communities. Various rules of thumb 
exist for establishing a “fair” price for hospitals, such as a multiple of 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA); 
but these rules must in fact be quite imprecise. Also, various stakeholders 
at the hospital being sold may have self-interests-such  as job preserva- 
tion and/or acquiring an equity interest in the enterprise-that  may not 
coincide with the broader public interest. 
Differential bargaining power is commonplace and does not necessarily 
provide a rationale for public oversight or even intervention since such 
intervention also inevitably has unintended adverse side effects. But the 
merit want nature of hospital care strengthens the argument for some type 
of public scrutiny. Some states require assessment of such transactions by 
the state attorney general or another regulatory body, and the proportion 
of states imposing such scrutiny is rapidly increasing, as is the activity of 
attorneys general in this field (Matzke 1997; Shactman and Fishman 1996; 
Honvitz 1998). 
Hospital ownership conversions take several forms. In this study, we 
consider a “conversion” to be any change in ownership type, either FP, 
NFP, or government. 
In the most straightforward case, one hospital or parent company pur- 
chases a NFP or public community hospital outright. In some, a hospital’s 
assets and liabilities are transferred to another organization at a zero pur- 
chase price. Alternatively,  a facility may be leased by another organization, 
through which control of the hospital assets is ceded to the lessor for long 
time periods-often  for several decades. Sometimes, ownership conver- 
sion is coincident with a horizontal merger. Such mergers represent full in- 
tegration of two or more hospital entities. Joint ventures involve less com- 
plete integration than full mergers. Joint ventures may be broad or limited 
in scope, such as for the provision of a single service. 
The objective of this article is to investigate whether communities have 
received a fair price for the hospitals they have sold or leased. To answer 
this question, we  analyzed 10 recent transactions involving hospitals in 
North Carolina and South Carolina in depth. The case studies provided 
critical information that  cannot be  obtained  from secondary sources. 
Most important were the financial and nonfinancial terms of the trans- 
actions. Among the financial terms were (1) purchase and lease prices, 
(2) recipient organizations of funds, which may be foundations, (3) various 
commitments made about provision of services, and (4)  the time path of 
outlays and commitments. Among the nonfinancial terms were organi- 
zational changes, such as in board membership and composition. State- 
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and community benefits involved  have  helped to guide and provide a 
cross-check on our own empirical analysis. 
To gauge whether the transactions prices were fair, we computed private 
rates of return under alternative assumptions about future cash flows that 
reflect both revenue accruing to the facility post transaction and possible 
efficiency gains. Normally, the price is fair if the cash flows yield a rate of 
return equal to the cost of capital. Since the net value to the community 
includes a range of social benefits, some of which are intangible, compari- 
sons of private rates of return with cost of capital provide an inadequate 
indication of value of the transaction to the seller. Therefore, we have also 
assessed community benefits that may not be reflected in the transaction 
price. 
Rate of return analyses were conducted by  some, or perhaps all, of the 
parties prior to the transactions, but undoubtedly not using a consistent 
methodology. Also, assumptions may have been made to support a par- 
ticular view  about the attractiveness of the transactions. However, the 
parties’ calculations may have been more accurate than ours because of in- 
sider knowledge or more access to detailed information about local mar- 
ket conditions. In any event, these calculations have not been made avail- 
able to us or, more generally, to the public at large. 
There is very little empirical evidence on changes that occur in hospital 
behavior postconversion or on the process of selection into a hospital con- 
version. Relevant behavioral responses include changes in pricing prac- 
tices; efficiency gains, which in turn affect hospital profitability; and the 
provision of uncompensated care and services judged essential or highly 
beneficial to the communities. Thus, as part of this study, we provide new 
empirical evidence on how ownership conversion affects these behaviors. 
In section 1.2, we  describe our methodology. Section 1.3 presents evi- 
dence from the 10 case studies. In section 1.4, we  present empirical evi- 
dence on the effects of conversions on profitability, and on provision of 
uncompensated care and particular hospital services. Data on uncompen- 
sated care were not collected for North Carolina. For this reason, and 
because a larger number of conversions occurred in Tennessee than in the 
Carolinas, our empirical analysis of conversions based on secondary data 
includes Tennessee as well as North Carolina and South Carolina. Some 
parts of the analysis were limited to Tennessee due in part to data avail- 
ability. Section 1.5 presents our analysis of rates of return on the invest- 
ments that the buyers made as well as of the cost of capital prevailing at 
the time of the transactions in the 10 case-study hospitals; this discussion 
is followed by a more general assessment of benefit in section 1.6. Finally, 
section 1.7 discusses conclusions and implications. Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  17 
1.2  Methods 
1.2.1  Case Study Sample and Site Visits: 
North Carolina and South Carolina 
We  identified all ownership changes that occurred in North Carolina 
and South Carolina between 1985 and 1996 using public use tapes from 
the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of  Hospitals, informa- 
tion supplied by the two state hospital associations, and, finally, telephone 
calls to hospitals when we  found inconsistencies between the first two 
sources. This process yielded 29 changes. 
We prepared a table that compared past with present ownership status. 
This table was presented to our study’s board of advisors. The board was 
highly knowledgeable about the hospital industry in the two states and 
was representative of the various community interests there. 
In consultation with the board, we  selected 10 cases for in-depth study 
(table 1.1). Selection was guided by these criteria: inclusion of all major 
types of  ownership conversions that occurred; representation of hospi- 
tals in both states; year of conversion (pre- versus post-1990), and type of 
transaction (acquisition, lease, joint venture). Many conversions occurred 
after 1994, limiting the amount of information we were able to obtain on 
these hospitals postconversion. Conversions taking place during the ear- 
lier period (“older conversions”)  afforded more time to measure cash flows 
postconversion and other impacts on the community that the conversion 
may have had. More recent conversions made it more likely that we could 
clearly capture the details of each conversion. Among the details were 
motives for converting, the process itself, and terms of charitable founda- 
tions related to hospital conversions. Foundations were  only created as 
part of the recent conversions. 
These 10 hospitals ranged in size from 64  acute care beds (Hilton Head 
Hospital) to 725 beds (Wake Medical Center), with half having fewer than 
Table 1.1  Ten Hospitals Studied in North and South Carolina 
Final Status 
Private 
Original Status  Not-for-Profit  Government  For-Profit 
Private not-for-profit  Cleveland Regional  Hilton Head 1995 
Medical Center  Byerly 1995 
1994  Providence 1995 
RoanokeIChowan  Cape Fear 1996 
1997  Mary Black 1996 
Government  Wake County 1997  Piedmont 1981 
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150 beds and four having between 200 and 300 beds. Four facilities are 
located in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with more than 500,000 
population, one is in an MSA with roughly 250,000, and the remainder 
are located outside of MSAs entirely. Although some facilities have teach- 
ing residents, none is considered a major teaching hospital. For each of 
the 10 hospitals selected, we  conducted a two-day site visit. During the 
site visit we  spoke with various stakeholders representing the hospital, the 
broader medical community, public healthlsocial services officials, em- 
ployers, churches, and community advocates. 
1.2.2  Analysis of Secondary Data 
Overview 
To supplement the case-study data, we used information for North Car- 
olina, South Carolina, and Tennessee from the American Hospital Asso- 
ciation's  (AHA'S) Annual Hospital  Survey (1987-1995),  Medicare Cost 
Reports (1983-1995),  and Tennessee Joint Annual Reports of Hospitals 
(1990-96).  The AHA surveys provided information on hospital outputs, 
concentration of output at the market level, and provision of particular 
services by the nonfederal short-term general hospitals in the three states. 
From the Medicare cost reports, we obtained prices, cost, cash flows, and 
balance-sheet information. The Tennessee  joint annual reports (JARs) pro- 
vided more detailed financial data than was available from either of the 
two other sources, including information on provision of uncompensated 
care and on taxes paid by  the for-profits. We  also attempted to collect 
financial statements from the 10 case-study hospitals. Only two facilities, 
however, were willing to release such information. Fortunately,  most perti- 
nent information from income statements and balance sheets  was available 
from the Medicare cost reports. 
Analysis Based on Joint Annual Report Data: Tennessee 
We  analyzed pricing, changes in average cost, profitability, and provi- 
sion of uncompensated care pre- and postownership change in Tennessee 
using data from Tennessee JARs. Dependent variables were net patient 
revenue and total expense per adjusted patient day; profit as a fraction 
of total hospital revenue, including and, alternatively, excluding interest, 
depreciation, and taxes; and uncompensated care charges as a fraction of 
total charges and, alternatively, of net patient revenue. In the analysis of 
pricing and cost, the dependent variables were expressed in natural loga- 
rithm form. 
The key explanatory variables were  binary variables for ownership in 
the base year (1990); for government and NFP ownership, with for-profit 
the omitted reference group; and for specific types of ownership conver- 
sions (government or NFP to FP  and FP  to NFP or government);  and for Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  19 
other conversions. We had to combine the other types of conversions (e.g., 
government to NFP) into a single variable because the number of observa- 
tions was insufficient to permit a more detailed specification. To measure 
the effects of conversions, we  specified separate variables for the pre- and 
postconversion years. The effect of conversion was measured as the dif- 
ference between two  coefficients, postconversion minus preconversion. 
This differencing eliminated time-invariant, otherwise unspecified hospital 
effects of the hospitals that converted. To determine whether or not there 
was a trend in profitability postconversion, we  substituted trend variables 
as an alternative to the binary variables for postconversion in the analysis 
of profitability. 
In addition, we  included explanatory variables for hospital output con- 
centration, a  Hefindahl-Hirschman  Index (HHI) for adjusted patient 
days in the hospital’s market area, real per capita income, the fraction of 
the population over age 65, the fraction of  the population enrolled in 
health maintenance organizations, the fraction of hospital admissions in 
the market covered by Medicaid, the unemployment rate, population den- 
sity, and a time trend. In the uncompensated care analysis, if the observa- 
tion was for an NFP or FP facility, we included a binary variable to indi- 
cate whether or not there was  a government hospital in the county. To 
account for implementation of Medicaid managed care in Tennessee- 
TennCare-in  1994, we  included a second Medicaid variable to indicate 
the Medicaid share during the years TennCare was  in effect (1994 on- 
ward); otherwise, this variable was set equal to zero. We  split the time 
trend into two variables-one  for 1990-93  and the other for 1994-96. For 
hospitals located in metropolitan areas, we considered the Standard Met- 
ropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) to be the market area. For other hospi- 
tals, we specified the county as the market area. All monetarily expressed 
variables were converted to 1995 dollars using the Consumer Price Index 
for all items. 
Analysis Based on American Hospital Association Surveys: 
Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina 
With AHA data, we  assessed the impacts of conversions on emergency 
room visits, on births, and on the availability of selected services. We  clas- 
sified  services into three categories: (1)  “unprofitable, essential” com- 
munity services: HIV/AIDS treatment, community health and education, 
emergency room, and laboddelivery; (2) elderly oriented services that may 
be adopted in response to Medicare Prospective Payment System: home 
health, rehabilitation, and skilled nursing facility; and (3)  services likely 
to be profitable: sports medicine, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and 
open heart surgery (Waters 1992). The dependent variables in the analysis 
of emergency room and laborldelivery output were the log of emergency 
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equations. Finally, we estimated equations for the share of admissions  cov- 
ered by (1) Medicaid and (2) Medicare to further assess impacts of owner- 
ship conversions on case mix. 
1.2.3  Analysis of Rates of Return 
Measurement of  Investment 
From the interviews, we  obtained information on purchase prices and 
lease payments, terminal values when specified (one case), and commit- 
ments to invest in the community or hospital facility (e.g., taking over in- 
digent care  obligations or debt  payments  previously financed  by  the 
county). These were specified as negative cash flows in the year such ex- 
penditures occurred or were expected to occur, expressed in 1995 dollars. 
Time Horizon 
For leases, we took the time horizon to be the term of the lease. Other- 
wise, we  based the rates of return on, alternatively, a 20- and a 30-year 
period, with the terminal value being 25 percent of the 1995 value of the 
facility as reported in the Medicare cost reports. Alternative calculations 
assumed different terminal values. 
Measurement of  Returns 
For two hospitals, we  could measure returns for some years postcon- 
version. For the eight others, we observed no postconversion years. How- 
ever, in all cases, we had to project returns for at least some years. For our 
projections, we used the parameter estimates from the regression for total 
margin based on Tennessee data to project future cash flows. To link the 
projection with historical cash flows, we  formed an index with the pro- 
jected 1995 margin as the base value. We multiplied this index by the mean 
cash flow for the hospital for years 1993-95.  We used a three-year average 
because of the volatility of cash flows and because the 1995 year was the 
year immediately preconversion for several hospitals. Alternative calcula- 
tions used two- and five-year averages. 
For future values of HHI and unemployment, we took values for 1995 
and assumed a constant value throughout. We projected population, pop- 
ulation over age 65, HMO and Medicaid patient shares, and real per cap- 
ita income in the hospital's market area based on annual growth rates ac- 
tually observed between 1987 and 1995. We capped the area HMO share 
at 75 percent and limited the Medicaid share to be within 225 percent of 
the 1995 value. When the HMO share was zero in 1995 (which occurred 
in four cases), we  assumed a 1 percent per year growth in share starting 
in 1996, with a maximum set at a 25 percent share. For the time trend, we 
took the midpoint of the two coefficients for the 1990-93  and  1994-96 Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  21 
periods, respectively. In the base case, we used the trend coefficient after 
15 years postconversion. Thereafter the trend was assumed to stop. Alter- 
native calculations capped the trend at 10 years and 20 years. We  used 
the coefficients from the relevant pre- and postconversion binary variables 
when the conversion occurred after 1995. For example, if  a conversion 
occurred on July 1,1996, we used the preconversion value for a half a year 
and the postconversion value for the other half. 
For depreciation, we computed a rate of depreciation based on the hos- 
pital’s fixed assets for 1995. We  used straight-line depreciation until the 
terminal value was reached. For interest, we computed an interest rate for 
1995 by dividing each hospital’s interest payments by  its long-term debt 
obligations. That interest rate was assumed to be constant in the future. 
Liabilities were decreased over time as the loan was paid back. For taxes 
paid by for-profit hospitals, we applied the federal and state statutory rates 
for corporate income taxes to annual net earnings (after interest and de- 
preciation). We obtained property tax rates from the county in which the 
for-profit hospital was located for 1996 tax year and used these rates for 
all years to estimate property taxes based on the value of total assets. The 
rate for all other taxes (2.4 percent) was calculated from Tennessee JARS 
data and was applied to annual net earnings. 
Cost of Capital to Hospitals 
Estimates of the weighted cost of capital were computed using a method 
reported in Sloan et al. (1988). For for-profit organizations,  we used an es- 
timate of beta from the capital asset pricing model of  1.41. To estimate 
the real cost of equity capital, we added the risk premium to the nominal 
risk-free interest rate for the year in which the transaction occurred (from 
Sloan et al. 1988). The sum was the nominal cost of equity capital, which 
we converted to real terms using the inflation rate for all items. The nomi- 
nal interest rate was taken to be the rate on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, 
again expressed in real terms using the inflation rate. The weighted cost of 
capital estimate used the hospital’s debt-to-assets ratio in the year before 
the conversion occurred as weights. In Sloan et al. (1988), the estimated 
cost of capital for the hospital sector was slightly higher when an estimate 
based on arbitrage pricing theory was used. 
For the nonprofit sector, the first task was to adjust the beta used for 
for-profit hospitals. This beta took account of the leverage in the NFP 
versus the FP hospital companies. The adjusted beta was 1.46. With this 
beta and the same risk-free interest rate information used above, we  esti- 
mated the real cost of equity capital. We used a 30-year municipal bond 
for the cost of debt. Again, we used information on the debt-to-assets ratio 
to obtain a weighted real cost of capital. The NFP cost of capital was also 
used for government facilities. Another benchmark used for comparison 22  Frank A. Sloan, Donald H. Taylor, Jr.,  and Christopher Conover 
was the ratio of the purchase price to average earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) in the three years prior 
to conversion. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In addition to testing alternative values to use for the terminal value of 
the facility, when to make the trend factor constant, and which base years 
to use in projecting earnings, we examined the impact on rate of returns of 
assuming that hospitals were able to achieve an additional 5 or 20 percent 
reduction in hospital expenses. That is, because our model was designed 
to project the average increase in earnings resulting from a particular type 
of conversion, it is conceivable that for any given facility, this projection 
failed to fully account for either cost-cutting opportunities or revenue- 
enhancing possibilities that would provide better earnings. The prospect 
of increasing earnings plausibly would come from cost reductions beyond 
that reflected in the historical data postconversion. Previous cost analysis 
based on data from a much earlier period indicated that FP companies 
achieve cost reductions several years after the conversion occurs (Becker 
and  Sloan  1985). Studies of hospital efficiency have  found substantial 
slack (e.g., 15 percent in Zuckerman et al. 1994). Several nonacademic ac- 
counts have maintained that FP companies achieve sizable margins (Jap- 
sen 1996; Moore 1997). In our calculations, we assumed the cost reduc- 
tions began in the third post-conversion year and were fully realized by 
the end of the seventh year. 
1.2.4  Assessing Community Benefit 
In addition to the empirical analysis described above, we  obtained per- 
ceived benefits from various stakeholders in the communities. We assessed 
these benefits in qualitative terms. 
1.3  Evidence from Case Studies of Converting Hospitals 
The case studies from the 10 North Carolina and South Carolina hospi- 
tals that converted provided information not available from various sec- 
ondary sources, including the rationale for converting; details about the 
terms of the conversions; disposition of proceeds from the sale or lease of 
the facility; changes in the hospital, such as renovation and expansion or 
deletion of services; plans for provision of uncompensated care; and views 
about the advantages and disadvantages of  the conversion. This section 
summarizes this descriptive material. 
1.3.1  Reasons for the Conversion 
In every case, the stated rationale for the conversion was to preserve the 
financial viability of the hospital for the benefit of the health care of local Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  23 
citizens and to preserve local jobs. Both benefits were viewed as particu- 
larly important for hospitals in rural areas. The alternative to the conver- 
sion was seen as either increased public subsidy, mainly in the form of 
investment in plant or equipment, or closure of the facility. 
One mechanism stated for improving financial viability was to increase 
bargaining power with managed care organizations by  affiliating with a 
network of  facilities. The desire to build hospital networks and referrals 
to existing hospitals also applied to the acquiring organizations. Another 
motive was to improve hospital efficiency, either by  assigning property 
rights to profits to investors or, in the case of public to private, not-for- 
profit conversions, to give hospitals additional flexibility in input use than 
is possible in a government-run organization. 
The motive of forestalling investment in hospitals by converting is more 
complex. Conceptually, hospital and community leaders might be stating 
that the cost of capital funds to the communities  exceeded that of others- 
either hospital companies or hospitals in other locations. It is not clear, 
however, that the communities viewed  the issue in  such terms. Rather, 
some seem to have thought of capital supplied by  these external sources 
as essentially “free” instead of being included in the price of hospital care 
paid by the local citizenry. In the case of government facilities, some public 
officials viewed running a hospital and/or the cost of raising funds through 
bond referenda or in some other way as a political liability, one that con- 
version would alleviate. 
1.3.2  Terms of Conversions 
We  studied two conversions of government (county) to FP facilities; 
one from government to NFP; five from NFP to FP  status, with for-profit 
companies the acquiring organization; and two acquisitions of NFP hos- 
pitals by  larger public hospitals/systems, one a hospital authority in the 
largest city in the Carolinas (Charlotte), and the other a teaching hospital 
serving a rural population in eastern North Carolina (table 1.2). For the 
last two transactions, the major negative consideration to the community 
was loss of community control. For the others, potential efficiency gains 
in marketing and in operations and the benefit of not having to infuse 
capital funds into the facility were balanced against concern about loss of 
community control, as well as a possible change in mission. In two of the 
NFP to FP conversions, survey respondents said the community did not 
accept the most favorable financial offer, opting instead to sell to organiza- 
tions providing greater long-term stability. We  did not obtain specific in- 
formation on the multiple offers or on the efforts communities made to 
secure and scrutinize multiple offers. 
The earliest conversion we  studied first occurred in  1981, with a resale 
occurring in 1988. In our rate-of-return analysis, we considered the trans- 
action year to be  1981 and then did backward extrapolation of relevant Table 1.2  Description of  Conversion Arrangements 
Hospital and Terms  Financial 
of Conversion  Year  Terms 
Government to For-Pro@ 
Purchase of Piedmont Memorial  Jan. 1981  $10 million 
Hospital by Tenet 
Purchase of Cherokee Memorial  Feb. 1984  $1.2 million + 
Hospital (Upstate Carolina  $5 million 
Medical Center) by National 
Medical Enterprises  payments over 
in lease 
3 years 
Not-for-Profit to For-Profit 
Purchase of Byerly Hospital  Aug. 1995  $31 million 
by Health Management 
Associates 
Sisters of  Charity of St. 
Augustine (Providence 
Hospital) and ColumbidHCA 
50/50 joint venture between  Nov.  1995  $80 million 
Investment/  Other 
Expansion Plans  Terms 
Built new $32.2 million  County had buyback 
hospital in 1983; $20  options in 1988 and 
million expansion from  1995; now 50-year- 
1995-98  term, at which time 
the contract must be 
renegotiated 
Must maintain hospital 
$18 million  emergency room, 
ambulance service, 
and indigent care 
Built a new hospital for 
Currently building new 
hospital for $45 million 
$7.9 million investment  Must maintain hospital 
and religious mission Purchase of Hilton Head 
Purchase of Cape Fear 
Hospital by  Tenet (then AMI) 
Memorial Hospital by 
ColumbidHCA 
Purchase of Mary Black 
Hospital by  Quorum 
Governmental to Private Not-for-Pro$t 
Transfer of assets from Wake 
County to Wake County 
Hospital System, Inc. 
Private Not-for-Pro$t  to Government 
Lease of Cleveland Regional 
Medical Center by  Charlotte/ 
Mecklenburg Health 
Authority 
Lease of RoanokelChowan 
Hospital by Rtt County 
Memorial Hospital 
May 1995  $26 million 
May 1996  $55 million 
July 1996  $58.5 million 
April 1997  Assumption of 
$100 to $118 
million debt 
July 1994  Lease of $1.7 
million per 
’ year; term is 
11 years 
Feb. 1997  $1 million + 
assumption 
of long-term 
debt; term is 
23 years 
Current $7 million 
$4.8 million expansion 
expansions in services 






majority of board 
Affiliation with and 
contract management 
by lessor in July 1994; 
lease began Oct. 1997; 
$1.4 million of lease 
proceeds into county 
general fund 
$1 million per year in  Foundation; F’itt can 
unspecified capital  buy outright for 
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variables to recover the stream of cash flows prior to 1987. The most re- 
cent conversion occurred in 1997. 
The only leases were for the two NFP hospitals that were acquired by 
public hospital systems. The term of one lease was 23 years; the other was 
11 years. In one case, the buyer committed to an annual lease payment 
plus assumption of the hospital’s long-term debt. In the other, the acquir- 
ing organization just paid a fixed lease payment. The ownership conver- 
sions involved some form of purchase; in one case, this was organized as 
a joint venture to preserve the hospital’s religious mission. In one of the 
NFP to FP conversions, the foundation that was created as a result of the 
transactions acquired a 20 percent equity position in  the hospital. This 
gave the community some continued input into hospital decision making. 
Subsequently, the foundation sold its equity to the hospital company that 
had purchased the hospital. Foundation directors said that they felt com- 
fortable with the progress the new owners had made and believed that the 
foundation could earn a higher return on its equity if  its funds were in- 
vested elsewhere. In one of the public-to-FP conversions, the terms of the 
contract must be renegotiated in 50 years. 
Eight of the 10 transactions included an explicit commitment to invest 
in the hospital. In some, the buyer committed to build a new facility. In 
others, commitments were made to expand specific services, such as reha- 
bilitation and obstetrics. In fact, with the exception of one hospital, every 
facility had either undertaken investment or had explicit plans to do so at 
the time the interviews were conducted. Two new hospitals, both resulting 
from public to for-profit conversions, had been built, and at one of  the 
other hospitals recently converted to for-profit status, plans had been de- 
veloped for constructing a new hospital and medical office complex. Other 
facilities had expanded existing services or had entered into new services. 
A key issue in most of the conversions was some form of guarantee of 
continued provision of uncompensated care. Nine agreements specified a 
minimum dollar amount or a catchment area for which the hospital was 
to accept patients irrespective of ability to pay. In the tenth case (Cape 
Fear), the agreement specified that uncompensated care was to be pro- 
vided at the level of comparable hospitals. 
1.3.3  Disposition of Proceeds from Sale or Lease 
Six foundations, organized to allocate the proceeds, were created from 
these  10 transactions. These included all of  the NFP to FP cases and 
one of the two leases. The majority of these foundations stipulated that 
the  funds be  used  not  only  for health-related initiatives but  also for 
community-oriented activities. However, several charters limited the types 
of community-oriented activities the foundation could support. An ex- 
ception to this broader community focus was the one with the lowest level Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  27 
of funding (Roanoke/Chowan),  which stipulated that all monies generated 
from lease payments be allocated to capital improvements in the hospital, 
hospital-owned physician practices, or other  hospital-based programs, 
such as hospice care. Funds were not to be used to fund uncompensated 
care. A second foundation containing cash reserves of the old NFP hospi- 
tal ($14 million) may be created in the future, but its focus in terms of 
giving is undetermined. 
One of  the foundations conducted a needs assessment and strategic 
planning jointly with the city in which it was located to determine educa- 
tion and economic development issues that were the highest priority to 
the community as a whole. 
1.3.4  Satisfaction after the Sale or Lease 
We  did not interview individuals in the parent organization that pur- 
chased or leased the facilities (although some of the hospital CEOs or 
others were employed by  these companies). However, for those conver- 
sions for which we  could compare pre- versus postconversion profitability, 
profits rose in each case. The vast majority of persons we  interviewed in 
the communities affected by the conversions were generally satisfied with 
the transaction. Hospital viability had been maintained, and purchasers 
had invested in local facilities. However, a persistent concern was loss of 
local control to an organization controlled by outsiders. 
1.4  Empirical Evidence on Effects of Conversions 
1.4.1  Profitability and Uncompensated Care: Tennessee Hospitals 
We  analyzed profitability without and with interest and depreciation 
using JAR data on Tennessee hospitals (table 1.3). The first regression was 
used in our analysis of the rates of return to the 10 case-study conversions 
that occurred in North Carolina and South Carolina. Both regressions re- 
vealed essentially the same result. Our discussion focuses on the second 
regression. 
On  average, NFP and  government hospitals in  Tennessee were  less 
profitable than those under for-profit ownership. Margins of NFP  and gov- 
ernment hospitals were, respectively, 3.0 percent and 5.9 percent below 
those of for-profit hospitals. Those NFP hospitals that converted were less 
profitable on average than their counterparts that did not convert (8.7 
percent less). Those NFP facilities  that converted to for-profit experienced 
an increase in their profit rate (5.6 percent). Those hospitals that converted 
from for-profit to either NFP or government status also experienced an 
increase in  profitability (4.6 percent). For  all  other conversions, there 
was a small pre- versus postconversion difference (0.6 percent decrease) Table 1.3  Effects of Conversion on Profit and Uncompensated Care: Tennessee 
Hospitals, 1990-1996 
Profit Rate  Profit Rate 
Explanatory  Excluding Interest  with Interest  Uncompensated 





NFP to FP (pre) 
NFP to FP (post) 
NFP to FP,  diff 
Pvalue (Prob >  F) 
FP to NFP or G (pre) 
FP to NFP or G (post) 
hospitals in county 
FP  to NFP or G,  diff 
F-value (Prob > F) 
Other conversion (pre) 
Other conversion 
Other conversion, diff 






Per capita income 
Unemployment rate 
Population over 65 (%) 




















































R2  = 0.25 
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RZ  = 0.22 
















































R2  = 0.14 
R2  = 0.12 
F(19, 795) = 6.69 
- 
Source: Tennessee Joint Annual Report of Hospitals, 1990-1996. Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  29 
in margins. In only two instances (NFP to FP hospitals, col. 2, table 1.3; 
and FP to NFP, col.  1, table 1.3) were the pre- versus postconversion 
changes in margins statistically significant at conventional levels (F-test). 
We tested for trends in profitability after conversion, and we  could not 
detect any. However, the length of postconversion period in the Tennessee 
hospital sample was often quite short (one to three years). The coefficient 
on the time-trend variable indicates that provision of uncompensated care 
increased over time (significant at the 10 percent level). 
Several other factors contributed to profitability. In particular, increased 
HMO share decreased profitability. Higher real per  capita income in- 
creased margins, as did population density. Surprisingly,  judging from the 
HHI parameter estimate, profits were lower in markets with less output 
concentration. Comparing net patient revenue with the cost results (not 
shown), the lower margin appears to be attributable to lower per hospi- 
tal demand. 
Both NFP and government hospitals in Tennessee provided more un- 
compensated care than did for-profit hospitals. Uncompensated care as a 
percentage of net patient revenue (the variant of the uncompensated care 
equation presented in table 1.3) was 3.1 percent higher for FP and 3.9 
percent higher for government facilities. NFP or FP hospitals located in 
Tennessee counties with a government hospital provided less uncompen- 
sated care on average. Hospitals that converted from NFP to FP status 
increased uncompensated care by 0.9 percent. By contrast, hospitals con- 
verting from FP to either NFP or government facilities decreased their 
provision of uncompensated care, and the marginal effect was over twice 
as large (2.2 percent versus 0.9 percent) as that for conversions in the other 
direction. There was also an increase in uncompensated care among the 
other hospitals that changed ownership status (1.8 percent). None of these 
changes, however, were statistically significant. Most noteworthy, conver- 
sions to for-profit status did not result in reduced uncompensated care; in 
fact, in such situations, provision of such care may have increased, albeit 
slightly. 
1.4.2  Effects of Conversions on Availability of Services: Hospitals 
in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
Both NFP and government hospitals in the three states were more likely 
to provide AIDS, community health, and patient education services, cet- 
eris paribus (table 1.4). (To conserve space, only the results for the owner- 
ship and the conversion variables are shown.) Conversion from NFP to 
FP status decreased the probability of having an AIDS program by  0.10 
and community health by 0.04, but it did not change the probability of 
having a patient education program. However, none of these changes were 
statistically significant at conventional levels (chi-square test). Interest- 
ingly, those hospitals that converted from FP to NFP or government status Table 1.4  Logit Analysis of Effects of Conversion on Availability of Services: North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
Hospitals 1987-1995 
Skilled  Open 
Explanatory  Community  Patient  Home  Nurse  Sports  Heart 
Variables  AIDS  Health  Education  Health  Rehabilitation  Facility  Medicine  Surgery  MRI 
Private, not-for-profit 
Government 
G or NFP to FP 
(Pre) 
G or NFP to FP 
(post) 
G or NFP to FP, diff 
X2 
(P-value) 
FP to G or NFP 
(Pre) 
FP to G or NFP 
(Post) 



























0.40  0.76 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
0.16  0.74 
(0.14)  (0.15) 
0.06  0.16 
(0.23)  (0.26) 
[0.08]  [O. 111 
[0.03]  [O. 111 
[0.01]  [0.02] 
(0.31)  (0.32) 
[-0.031  [0.02] 
-0.04  -0.00 
0.33  0.00 
(0.57)  (0.94) 
-0.09  0.01 
(0.35)  (0.34) 
-0.01  1.04 
(0.62)  (0.59) 
[-0.001  [O. 151 
0.02  0.15 
0.01  2.31 
(0.91)  (0.13) 
-0.15  0.13 
















































































































































Source: American Hospital Association, Annual Hospital Survey, 1987-1995. 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. Marginal effects are in brackets. Only ownership and conversion results are shown 
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also dropped AIDS programs, but  they  added patient care programs. 
Again, however, these changes were not statistically significant. 
Among services oriented toward the elderly, conversions from NFP or 
government to FP facilities increased the probability of offering home 
health by  0.11 but decreased the probability of having rehabilitation by 
0.12 and of having a skilled nursing unit by  0.34. The third change was 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
For the conversions to government or NFP from for-profit status, there 
were increases in the probability of offering home health by  0.14 and of 
rehabilitation by 0.19. However, neither difference was statistically  signifi- 
cant. We  could not estimate the effects of this type of ownership conver- 
sion on provision of  a skilled nursing facility because of an inadequate 
number of observations. 
The final category included services that are likely to be profitable and 
oriented to a more general population. Among these, for those facilities 
converting to for-profit status, the probability of offering sports medicine 
increased by  0.13 and the probability of  having MRI increased by  0.02 
after the conversion, but the probability of doing open heart surgery de- 
creased by 0.06. The first and third changes in probability were statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
1.4.3  Effects of Conversions on Emergency Room Visits, 
Deliveries, and Medicare and Medicaid Shares: Hospitals 
in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
Conversion from NFP or government to for-profit status resulted in a 
12 percent increase in emergency room visits and a 20 percent increase in 
the fraction of admissions covered by  Medicaid (table 1.5). There were 
much more substantial decreases in the volume of deliveries (27 percent 
on average) but a slight decrease in the fraction of patients on Medicare 
(3 percent). Only the change in the Medicaid share was statistically sig- 
nificant at conventional levels. However, conversions from FP to NFP or 
government status resulted in larger percentage increases in numbers of 
visits to emergency rooms. Following such conversions, the volume of de- 
liveries increased. Only in the case of the Medicaid patient share were 
decreases observed. But none of these changes were statistically  significant 
at conventional levels. 
In sum, conversions resulted in a mixed pattern of adoption of services. 
Judging from the empirical evidence, it would be inappropriate to attribute 
much of the change in service offerings or volume to a particular type of 
change in ownership status. Table 1.5  Effects of Conversion on  Emergency Room Visits, Deliveries, and Medicare and Medicaid Shares: North Carolina and South Carolina 
Hospitals, 1987-1995 
Explanatory Variables  Log (ER Visits)  Log (Deliveries)  Log (Medicaid Share)  Log (Medicare Share) 
Private, not-for-profit 
Government 
G or NFP to FP (pre) 
G or NFP to FP (post) 
G or NFP to Fp,  dilT 
F-value 
mob  > F) 
FP to G or NFP (pre) 
FP to G or NFP (post) 
FP to G or NFP, diff 
F-value 
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R2  = 0.42 
R2  = 0.41 



















R2  = 0.24 
R2  = 0.23 
F(21, 2734) = 41.12 
-0.03 
- 
Source: American Hospital Association, Annual Hospital Survey, 1987-1 995. 
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1.5  Rates of Return and Cost of Capital: 10 Hospital 
Conversions in North Carolina and South Carolina 
1.5.1  Base Case 
Real rates of return were computed under alternative assumptions de- 
scribed above (table 1.6). With some notable exceptions, the rates of re- 
turn, especially those involving a for-profit purchaser, generally were low. 
Unless otherwise stated, we discuss the base case rate with a 30-year time 
horizon or the lease, whichever applied. Results were fairly insensitive to 
variations in key assumptions-term  and terminal value. 
The two cases with the most postconversion experience were Piedmont 
(1981) and Upstate (1984). For these, much of the postconversion experi- 
ence was actually observed. For Piedmont and Upstate, respectively, the 
rates of return were 9.4 percent and 6.7 percent. This was above the esti- 
mated real cost of capital to Piedmont (6.3 percent) at the time these trans- 
actions occurred, but it was lower than that to Upstate (7.6 percent). Pied- 
mont was able to earn this return despite a buyback provision that was 
highly favorable to the seller. We learned from our case studies that such 
buyback arrangements are now uncommon. Upstate is located in a highly 
competitive market marked by  other recent for-profit acquisitions and 
merger activities. Moreover, the purchase terms were established through 
a  bidding process involving at least  six  other  firms, including Hospi- 
tal Corporation of America, which had previously managed the hospital 
under  contract.  The original purchaser, National  Medical Enterprises 
(NME), sold the hospital shortly after building a new facility due to a 
strategic change in company focus. NME either may have been willing to 
forgo some profitability in order to gain access to a new market or may 
have miscalculated the difficulty of turning this hospital around (the some- 
what low returns are in spite of considerable efficiency improvements, ex- 
pansion of facilities, and success in attracting new physicians to the com- 
munity). 
Among the NFP to FP conversions, the most favorable rate of return 
was for Providence Hospital, which was a  joint venture between the Sisters 
of Charity of St. Augustine and ColumbidHCA. In this case, the rate of 
return of 9.4 percent was above the estimated cost of capital to Columbia/ 
HCA of 7.7 percent. In all other cases in this category, the real rate of re- 
turn was appreciably below the real cost of capital. 
For example, in the Cape Fear case, the hospital was slightly profitable. 
But prior to conversion, it lost some key  managed care contracts to a 
crosstown rival. Since ColumbidHCA acquired the hospital, the hospi- 
tal has regained some of the lost business. However, none of  these spe- 
cial considerations were considered in our rate-of-return calculations. The 
area has been growing; we accounted for population growth in our calcu- 
lations. Table 1.6  Rates of  Return and Cost of Capital (Base Case): 10 North Carolina and South Carolina Transactions 
Base Case Real Rate of Return 
Conversion  cost of 
Ratio of Purchase Price to 
(IRR) % Calculated Over  Weighted Real  Preconversion EBITDAa 
Date  30 Years  20 Years  Lease Period  Capital  Cash Priceb  Full Price" 












Not-for-profit to for-profit 
Public to not-for-profit 






















































Note:  Base case measures internal rate of return (IRR) of all cash flow, including purchase price, lease payments, and any new obligations taken on by  the 
purchaser (i.e., taking over indigent care payments or debt obligations  previously financed by county) in the lease arrangements; rate of return is calculated 
over lease period only. In base case, trend variable (= 1 in 1990) is assumed to be constant after 15 years (that is, this variable reduces the IRR by  the same 
amount in year 30 as in year 15). 
"EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Preconversion EBITDA is the actual average annual amount for the three years 
prior to the year of conversion (not adjusted for inflation). Note that in the case of Cleveland Hospital, the lease arrangement did not begin until 1997, but 
the boards merged in 1994. Therefore, the preconversion EBITDA period is 1991-1993. 
bCash price equals the total amount paid by  purchaser to acquire the hospital, exclusive of other obligations  financed over time out of hospital operations. 
Total price equals cash price plus all other new obligations financed over time out of hospital operations, including lease payments, service, indigent care, 
or debt obligations not previously financed by  the hospital itself (i.e., formerly subsidized by  county). Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  35 
The lowest rate of return for the NFP to FP conversions was for Hilton 
Head (- 1.8 percent). In this case, the purchaser (Tenet) may  have rea- 
soned that it would benefit from construction of a retirement community 
across the river that eventually would house 40,000 persons, a develop- 
ment not reflected in our calculations. 
Much more favorable to the buyer or acquirer were the county govern- 
ment to NFP transaction in Wake County (NC) and the NFP (Cleveland) 
to the hospital district authority transaction in Charlotte (NC). In Wake, 
for which the rate of return was 253 percent, compared to a cost of capital 
of 4.7 percent, the county was highly interested in finding a way to ensure 
the provision of indigent care without having to use tax funds to pay for 
those services, but it wanted to avoid selling or leasing to a for-profit or- 
ganization. Roughly $400 million was transferred to a new NFP organiza- 
tion on apparently highly favorable terms to the new organization. In ex- 
change, this organization guaranteed payment of $1  59 million in county 
debt obligations (which it already had been paying off prior to the conver- 
sion) and is committed to providing indigent care without the traditional 
county subsidy (several million annually), but the cost of fulfilling these 
obligations is considerably below the hospital’s net earnings. 
In the Cleveland Regional Medical Center situation, a period of leader- 
ship instability led to a request for assistance from the Charlotte/Mecklen- 
burg Health Authority; an affiliation agreement and contract management 
by the Health Authority began in 1994. This interaction led to a leasing ar- 
rangement whereby the lessor pays $1.7 million per year for 1  1 years (start- 
ing October 1997) in return for a cash flow that is much larger than this. 
We estimated a 196 percent rate of return to the lessor on this transaction, 
compared to a cost of capital of 5.0 percent. 
By  contrast, in the case of Roanoke/Chowan, for which the rate of re- 
turn over the lease period was  -4.2  percent, the lessor, Pitt County Me- 
morial Hospital-which  is the teaching hospital for East Carolina Uni- 
versity’s medical school-assumed  the hospital’s debt payments of $25 
million over the 23-year life of the lease. In the Cleveland case, the lessor 
assumed no debt. 
Another way to view the purchase price is to compare it to EBITDA- 
the stream of earnings that the purchaser could be expected to enjoy ab- 
sent large shifts in the market. If we  look only at the cash amount paid 
(i.e., direct payments paid by the buyer at closing or through lease pay- 
ments), the ratio to EBITDA was between 4.4 and 8.6. If we  use the full 
price-that  is, inclusive of long-term obligations such as covering previ- 
ously subsidized indigent care-the  ratios are much higher. In contrast, 
the ratios for not-for-profit and quasi-public acquisitions were much lower, 
and two of these, Wake County at 2.6 and Cleveland at 1.3, were much 
below the standard EBITDA multiples (typically 4-8)  used in hospital 
acquisitions or those in other private markets. 36  Frank A. Sloan, Donald H. Taylor, Jr., and Christopher Conover 
1.5.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
To test the robustness of our findings, we performed several sensitivity 
analyses. Our findings generally were robust with respect to assumptions 
about the terminal value of the hospital in the final year of the rate-of- 
return calculation. In more than half of the cases, rates of return varied 
by less than one-half of a percentage point. Hilton Head showed a much 
larger swing in returns, which reflects its relatively low projected stream of 
net earnings compared to the value of the facility itself. Likewise, it made 
almost no difference whether the trend factor flattened in year 10 or year 
20. Not surprisingly, the base period used to project earnings made more 
of a difference, reflecting the volatility of hospital earnings in recent years. 
Nevertheless, changes in this assumption do not alter the overall flavor of 
our conclusions: For-profits continue to have rates of return at or below 
their cost of capital, while those for not-for-profit facilities were substan- 
tially higher. One final excursion was to see what happened if we assumed 
that our method somehow had been insufficient to account for the cost 
savings said to be achieved by for-profit companies. With an assumed cost 
reduction of 20 percent from the hospital’s 1995 base, the Mary Black 
transactions rate of  return equaled the cost of capital (compare the 6.2 
percent return in table 1.7 with the 6.3 percent cost of capital in table 1.6). 
The largest discrepancy was for Hilton Head, with a rate of return of 4.6 
percent with a 20 percent expense reduction compared to a cost of capital 
of 6.8 percent. It may be appropriate to infer equality of returns and costs 
in this case too because we did not specifically account for relative demand 
growth in this market. 
Overall, with the caveat that we only investigated 10 cases in two states 
and used parameter estimates from a third, the pattern of the rates of re- 
turn offers two important implications. First, the communities typically 
received more than a fair financial return on their assets when they trans- 
acted with a for-profit organization (in five out of seven such cases, the 
for-profit purchaser had returns below their own cost of capital). Despite 
the limitations of  our sample, our findings are consistent with a recent 
U.S. General Accounting Office analysis of 14 not-for-profit hospital con- 
versions to for-profit status in which it was found that most of the buy- 
ers had overpaid for the facilities (Weissenstein 1997). Second, the very 
high returns occurred when the communities dealt with NFP or quasi- 
governmental organizations. The lesson is that even private nonprofit and 
governmental organizations may take advantage of a highly profitable op- 
portunity when they can. Table 1.7  Rate of Return Sensitivity Analysis: 10 North Carolina and South Carolina Transactions 
If Terminal Value  If Projected  If Hospital 
Additional 
as YO  of 1995  If Trend Factor  Earnings  Expenses Cut an 
Value =  Constant after  Based on 
0%  100%  10 Years  20 Years  1994-95  1991-95  5%  2Ph 











Not-for-profit to for-profit 
Public to not-for-profit 
Not-for-profit to quasi-public 
9.41 
6.72 
9.42  9.40 
















1.96  1.71 
1.69  0.56 
0.16  (0.61) 
9.37  9.27 





































Note:  All rates-of-return calculations based on 30 years, except for lease arrangements, in which case lease period is used. NA = Not applicable. 
'Efficiency savings not calculated since there is ample actual data on revenues, expenses, and margins in the postconversion period. 
bTransfer with restrictions on sale. Purchaser presumed not able to sell facility in terminal year. 
cEfficiency savings only calculated for conversions to for-profit status. 
dDue to lease arrangement, purchaser not able to sell facility in terminal year. 38  Frank A. Sloan, Donald H. Taylor, Jr., and Christopher Conover 
1.6  Nodbancia1 Returns: 10 Hospital Conversions 
in North Carolina and South Carolina 
The above analysis of conversion effects did not reveal that a systematic 
reduction in services occurs when a government or NFP hospital converts 
to for-profit status or the converse. Lack of statistical significance may re- 
flect lack of statistical  power. However, in many cases, magnitudes of change 
were not great either. 
An  alternative approach is to gauge responses of stakeholders in  10 
communities (table 1.8). Six of the 10 cases seemed to have been threat- 
ened with closure (“had effect” in the table). A paramount issue to com- 
munity leaders was to keep a hospital in their communities. For both of 
the government (county) to FP  conversions, this was a primary motive for 
selling the hospitals. In one case, a referendum to allow authorization to 
issue bonds was rejected by the voters. In the other, county officials were 
unwilling to raise the capital funds. In the NFP to FP  conversion category, 
three of the five hospitals appeared to have been threatened with closure, 
the other two having had a fairly strong financial position. Of  the re- 
maining three hospitals, one (Roanoke/Chowan)  had experienced a declin- 
ing occupancy rate and had difficulty in recruiting and retaining physi- 
cians and desired a link to a larger hospital system. 
Foundations were formed in six cases, all recent conversions; five were 
products of conversions to for-profit facilities. The sixth (Roanoke/Cho- 
wan) was limited because of the small size of the lease payments that fund 
the foundation and the stipulation that this money must be used for un- 
specified improvements to the hospital or its affiliated enterprises. In this 
case, another foundation with an unspecified focus may be created in the 
near future using cash reserves on hand at the time of the lease. Of the 
six, two charters limited foundation outlays to health (Cape Fear and 
Mary Black), although even in the case of Mary Black, health is broadly 
defined and the emphasis will be on health promotion and wellness rather 
than on traditional medical services. In the remaining agreements, the 
foundation may fund both health and other activities-mainly  education, 
the arts, and local economic development. Several foundations are among 
the largest in the state. As another measure of magnitude of giving, one 
foundation’s annual outlays match the level of charitable giving by United 
Way  (Cape Fear), and in two other cases (Mary Black and Providence) 
outlays will considerably exceed those of United Way. 
Hospitals also introduced or expanded cardiac catheterization, rehabili- 
tation, obstetrics/delivery, skilled nursing facility beds, home health ser- 
vices, andlor renovation of emergency room facilities with new  24-hour 
capabilities. Of course, some of this construction may have occurred ab- 
sent conversion, but community leaders often attributed this investment 
to these transactions or, at minimum, believed that conversion resulted Table 1.8  Nonfinancial Benefits from Key  Informant Interviews: 10 North Carolina and South Carolina Transactions 
~~ 
Hospital  Effect on Avoiding Closure  Foundation  Service Expansions  Uncompensated Care 
Government to for-profit 
Piedmont  Had effect; county rejected 
bond referendum in 1979 
and new hospital was 
needed 
Upstate  Had effect; county 
unwilling to invest 
capital necessary for 
upkeep and expansion 
Private not-for-profit to government 
Byerly  Had effect; needed capital 
and improved purchasing 
power 
Providence  No effect; conversion was 
effort to obtain capital 
to finance needed 
expansions 
Hilton Head  Had effect; hospital had 
falling occupancy and 
defaulted bonds in past 
that hurt future prospects 
None 
None 
Foundation created $30 
million; funds for health, 
education, and local 
economic development 
Foundation created $80 
million; supports 
hospital’s religious 
mission, including health 
Foundation created $21 
million in funds for 
health, education, and 
the arts 
Built new hospital, 
outpatient facility, 
neurosurgery, open heart 
surgery, cardiac 
catheterization, inpatient 
psychiatry, and ER 
expanded ER, and 
guaranteed continuation 
of ambulance service 
previously subsidized 
by county 
Built new hospital, 
Building a new hospital 
Laser eye surgery, upgraded 
cardiac catheterization, 
18 skilled nurse facility 
beds, MRI, plans for 
satellite facility 
Rehabilitation, cardiac 
catheterization,  15 skilled 
nurse facility beds, and 
obstetrics; future plans to 
build satellite facility 
Minimum guarantee for 
residents of York County 
(SC) of $475,00O/year; 
hospital pays county 
Medicaid tax 
Guarantee for residents of 
Cherokee county 
Guarantee to continue 
present indigent level 
Guarantee continuation of 
religious mission, 
including indigent care, 
no abortions, etc. 
Guarantee to continue 
preconversion levels 
(continued) Table 1.8  (continued) 
Hospital  Effect on Avoiding Closure  Foundation  Service Expansions  Uncompensated Care 
Cape Fear  Had effect; loss of managed 
care contracts to rival 
hospital increased need 
for an outside partner 
No effect; felt that long- 
term survival enhanced 
by  having better 
purchasing power 
Mary Black 
Government to private not-for-profit 
Wake County  No effect; primary 
motivation was to reduce 
county responsibility and 
expense of running 
hospital 
Private not-for-profit to government 
RoanokelChowan  Had effect; capital needed; 




however, that a larger 
partner with subspecialty 
services needed for long- 
term survival 
Cleveland  No effect; believed, 
Foundation created $40 
million with focus on 
health and prevention 
Foundation created $62 
million; focuses on 
wellness and prevention 
None 
Foundation created; $1 







MRI and cardiac 
catheterization now fixed, 
geriatric psych unit, 
skilled nurse facility, and 
birthing center 
No guarantee but transfer 
enables joint ventures 
outside of county which 
were previously 
prohibited 
Total value of lease 





Guarantee at prior levels 
Guarantee at $53 million 
Guarantee for residents of 
4-county area 
$300,00O/year from lease to 
a community indigent 
care network plus 
hospital guarantee of 
historical levels Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  41 
in such facility improvements occurring more quickly than would have 
happened otherwise. Further, some services, such as rehabilitation, were 
likely to be profitable to the facility. In general, the services that were ex- 
panded were likely to be profitable. 
Provision of  uncompensated care is  another community benefit. In 
some contracts, the guarantee was stated as a dollar minimum or as set 
levels provided prior to the transaction. In others, the buyer guaranteed 
that residents of specified areas would have access to the facility. One 
contract specified a guarantee of provision of uncompensated care to a 
four-county area, the area it served historically, but in general, the areas 
coincided with the hospital’s county. Even in the one case without a guar- 
antee, respondents maintained that uncompensated care had been main- 
tained at prior levels since the conversion. Our findings are consistent with 
a recent California study showing that of  17 for-profit acquisitions be- 
tween 1980 and 1991, the conversions did not result in a statistically sig- 
nificant change in the level of uncompensated care or preexisting trends 
(Young et al. 1997). Likewise, Project HOPE conducted 10 case studies 
similar to ours, including 8 for-profit acquisitions, and concluded that 
charity and uncompensated care typically continued at the same or higher 
levels following conversion (Mark et al. 1997). 
Valuing the benefits of foundation activities and expanded hospital ser- 
vices would be difficult at best and was not undertaken here. Such compu- 
tations would be more important if the financial returns from these trans- 
actions had been advantageous to the buyers. Determining the benefits of 
these foundations is made even more difficult by the large range of projects 
they could fund. 
1.7  Conclusions, Implications, and an Agenda for Future Research 
For many conversions, especially those in which a for-profit organiza- 
tion was the purchaser, the purchase price seems to have been right, or 
perhaps even too high, but not too low.  The conversions for which the 
purchase price was too low involved other types of purchasers. In these 
cases, the seller desired to sell or lease but did not want to deal with a for- 
profit organization. 
One reason for eschewing a for-profit hospital company might have 
been a fear that community benefits would be unduly sacrificed. But we 
did not find that the for-profit hospital companies reduced such benefits 
after they acquired the facilities. Many of the conversions were recent, and 
we cannot exclude the possibility of substantial cuts downstream. 
One view might be that providing excess returns to a governmental or 
NFP organization does no harm since the excess return will ultimately be 
returned to the community, the seller or lessor, in some form. However, 
such funds need not be allocated in this way,  but rather in the form of 42  Frank A. Sloan, Donald H. Taylor, Jr., and Christopher Conover 
emoluments to management or to other  “insider” stakeholders. Also, 
when the buyer is an organization in another community, the recipients of 
any dividend are likely to be citizens of other communities. Finally, ac- 
quisition by  a not-for-profit purchaser may only be an intermediate step 
to ultimate conversion to for-profit status. 
Our results imply that if there is a case for public scrutiny of these trans- 
actions, such scrutiny should not be limited to those cases in which the 
buyer is a for-profit hospital company. In general, the benefits of such 
scrutiny should be weighed against the costs. It is not clear that such scru- 
tiny would protect the public any better, and it would probably not protect 
as well as competitive bidding and/or an open discussion that invites com- 
munity input into the pros and cons of various alternatives. 
Our findings raise at least two important questions. First, do these re- 
sults generalize? Second, why should publicly held corporations undertake 
investments for which the rate of return falls far short of the cost of cap- 
ital? 
The results may  not  generalize. Further research on conversions in 
other states should be undertaken. It is worth noting, however, that the 
same companies were involved in conversions in other states during the 
same time period. Consultants that assisted the parties with these transac- 
tions would have been available to similarly situated parties in other states. 
Tennessee has had among the highest for-profit hospital shares in  the 
United States historically. By  contrast, North Carolina and South Caro- 
lina have had much lower for-profit shares. 
The issue of why  some hospital companies may have undertaken un- 
profitable investments is more difficult to answer. A glib answer would be 
that we  only analyzed a small number of  transactions. More likely, the 
companies may have included returns not included in our calculations, 
such as network building or establishing new footholds in new markets. 
But even so, if  the communities had been “exploited,” one would have 
expected to observe much higher rates of return. Also, our analysis of 
changes in profitability of hospitals that converted to for-profit status in 
Tennessee showed that, on average, the profit rate only increased slightly 
after the conversions occurred. Perhaps the buyers’ intentions were  not 
fully realized. Clearly, observed patterns of returns reflect the relative bar- 
gaining strength of  the parties. It would be useful to model bargaining 
explicitly. Of course, to obtain useful quantitative results, it would be nec- 
essary to have a much larger sample. 
The hospital industry is contracting due to growth of managed care, 
among other reasons. Running a hospital in a “business as usual” fashion 
will  almost surely be a money-losing proposition, as our regression re- 
sults indicate. 
Finally, both the decision-making process and the decisions of founda- 
tions created as a consequence of sale or lease of hospitals have not been Hospital Conversions: Is the Purchase Price Too Low?  43 
documented. Whether or not these foundations truly yield a community 
benefit is an open question, one worthy of further study. 
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